- Reforming the Board. We need to improve the independence, ethics and dispute resolution processes. I will be a root and branches reformer to encourage the Board to make a couple of the positions available to truly independent directors. I will be encouraging all current Board and future Board members to undertake an Institute of Company Directors course to understand their duties, and the way they integrate with the Foundation they are responsible for.
- Inclusion. I want OWASP to adopt one of the many fabulous inclusion policies for our community and our conferences. Everywhere you look, such as Reddit or Slashdot, it’s all too easy for the odd bad apple to come in and ruin a working community or local group with unnecessary drama. We need to make sure our policies and standards are inclusive of all who want to participate, regardless of merit or standing; but this has an important caveat – not at any price. We need to make sure we are an open and safe community for all of humanity, those from outside the USA, regardless of gender, sexuality, religion, politics, ethnic background, and all the other ones I’ve missed.
- Projects. We must broaden our church to be truly inclusive of modern web applications, web services, cloud, system, embedded and mobile. I propose the Board create a process for RedBook style short intensive workshops of 1-2 weeks where projects can ask for funding to move their project to completion or a much higher state of quality. This should be backed by industry participation, ensuring our core deliverables are actually useful to developers and architects. The days of funding anyone but the content creators must end. We need to be famous for our developer centric projects, and these projects should be immediately useful to developers and their teams.
- Standards. We need to be the trusted advisor to PCI, NIST, and ISO. This is not an easy path to take, but if we are not at the table, we become irrelevant. Additionally, we have an opportunity to take our flagship standards products (Application Security Verification Standard and Proactive Controls) and plug a market hole for easily applicable advice to developers. Developers don’t read ISO 27034, they don’t read PCI DSS. They should be reading and using our materials.
- Education. We need to create University level course (100, 200, 300) with the help of a university educator. I propose that we ask a range of universities to come to AppSec USA and start the process of formulating a curriculum, which once completed will become the default standard university curriculum for application security.
After running my blog on various virtual hosts and VPSs since 1998, my measures put into place to protect this site and the others on here were insufficient to protect against weak passwords.
Let’s just say that if you are a script kiddy and know all about press.php, tmpfiles.php and others, you have terrible operational security. There will be consequences. That is not a threat.
Be a part of the upcoming AppSec EU in Cambridge!
* UPDATE! Eoin can’t be in two places at once, so our hack-a-thon has moved to Tuesday 24 June. Same room, same bat channel. *
Eoin Keary and myself will be running an all day working party on the Developer Guide On June 24 from 9 AM to 6 PM GMT. The day starts with Eoin giving a DevGuide status update talk, and then we get down with editing and writing.
I will be working remotely from the end of Eoin’s talk to til 1 pm UK time, and I so I encourage everyone who has an interest in the Devguide to either attend the workshop in person, or consider helping out remotely. Sign up here!
My goal is to get the entire text of the OWASP Developer Guide 2.0 ported to the new format at GitHub, and hopefully finish 4 chapters. To participate, you will need a browser and a login to GitHub. You will also probably want a login to Google+ so you can be a part of an “on air” all day hangout so you can ask me anything about the DevGuide, or just chill with other remote participants.
In the last few weeks, a prominent researcher, Dragos Ruiu (@dragosr) has put his neck out describing some interesting issues with a bunch of his computers. If his indicators of compromise are to be believed (and there is the first problem), we have a significant issue. The problem is the chorus of “It’s not real” “It’s impossible” “It’s fake” is becoming overwhelming without sufficient evidence one way or another. Why are so many folks in our community ready to jump on the negative bandwagon, even if they can’t prove it or simply don’t have enough evidence to say one way or another?
My issue is not “is it true” or “I think it’s true” or “I think it’s false”, it’s that so many info sec “professionals” are basically claiming:
- Because I personally can’t verify this issue is true, the issue must be false. QED.
This fails both Logic 101, class 1, and also the scientific method.
This is not a technical issue, it’s a people issue.
We must support all of our researchers, particularly the wrong ones. This is entirely obvious. If we eat our young and most venerable in front of the world’s media, we will be a laughing stock. Certain “researchers” are used by their journalist “friends” to say very publicly “I think X is a fool for thinking that his computers are suspect”. This is utterly wrong, foolhardy, and works for the click bait articles the J’s write and on their news cycle, not for us.
Not everybody is a viable candidate for having the sample. In my view, the only folks who should have a sample of this thing are those who have sufficient operational security and budget to brick and then utterly destroy at least two or twenty computers in a safe environment. That doesn’t describe many labs. And even then, you should have a good reason for having it. I consider the sample described to needing the electronic equivalent of Level PC4 bio labs. Most labs are not PC4, and I bet most of infosec computing labs are not anywhere near capable of hosting this sample.
Not one of us has all of the skills required to look at this thing. The only way this can be made to work is by working together, pulling together E.Eng folks with the sort of expensive equipment only a well funded organisation or a university lab might muster, microcontroller freaks, firmware folks, CPU microcode folks, USB folks, file system folks, assembly language folks, audio folks, forensic folks, malware folks, folks who are good at certain types of Windows font malware, and so on. There is not a single human being alive who can do it all. It’s no surprise to me that Dragos has struggled to get a reproducible but sterile sample out. I bet most of us would have failed, too.
We must respect and use the scientific method. The scientific method is well tested and true. We must rule out confirmation bias, we must rule out just “well, a $0.10 audio chip will do that as most of them are paired with $0.05 speakers and most of the time it doesn’t matter”. I actually don’t care if this thing is real or not. If it’s real, there will be patches. If it’s not real, it doesn’t matter. I do care about the scientific method, and it’s lack of application in our research community. We aren’t researchers for the most part, and I find it frustrating that most of us don’t seem to understand the very basic steps of careful lab work and repeating important experiments.
We must allow sufficient time to allow the researchers to collaborate and either have a positive or negative result, analyse their findings and report back to us. Again, I come back to our journalist “friends”, who can’t live without conflict. The 24 hour news cycle is their problem, not our problem. We have Twitter or Google Plus or conferences. Have some respect and wait a little before running to the nearest J “friends” and bleating “It’s an obvious fake”.
We owe a debt to folks like Dragos who have odd results, and who are brave enough to report them publicly. Odd results are what pushes us forward as an industry. Cryptoanalysis wouldn’t exist without them. If we make it hard or impossible for respected folks like Dragos to report odd results, imagine what will happen the next time? What happens if it’s someone without much of a reputation? We need a framework to collaborate, not to tear each other down.
Our industry’s story is not the story about the little boy who cried wolf. We are (or should be) more mature than a child’s nursery rhyme. Have some respect for our profession, and work with researchers, not sully their name (and yours and mine) by announcing before you have proof that something’s not quite right. If anything, we must celebrate negative results every bit as much as positive results, because I don’t know about you, but I work a lot harder when I know an app is hardened. I try every trick in the book, including the stuff that is bleeding edge as a virtual masterclass in our field. I bet Dragos has given this the sort of inspection that only the most ardent forensic researcher might have done. If he hasn’t gotten that far, it’s either sufficiently advanced to be indistinguishable from magic, or he needs help to let us understand what is actually there. I bet that few of us could have gotten as far as Dragos has.
To me, we must step back, work together as an industry – ask Dragos: “What do you need?” “How can we help?” and if that’s “Give me time”, then let’s step back and give him time. If it’s a USB circuit analyser or a microcontroller dev system and plus some mad soldering skills, well, help him, not tear him down. Dragos has shown he has sufficient operational security to research another 12-24 months on this one. We don’t need to know now, now, or now. We gain nothing by trashing his name.
Just stop. Stop trashing our industry, and let’s work together.
So I’m getting a lot of Twitter spam with links to install bad crap on my computer.
More than just occasionally, these DM’s are sent by folks in the infosec field. They should know better than to click unknown links without taking precautions.
So what do you need to do?
Simple. Follow these basic NIST approved rules:
Contain – find out how many of your computers are infected. If you don’t know how to do this, assume they’re all suspect, and ask your family’s tech support. I know you all know the geek in the family, as it’s often me.
Eradicate – Clean up the mess. Sometimes, you can just use anti-virus to clean it up, other times, you need to take drastic action, such as a complete re-install. As I run a Mac household with a single Windows box (the wife’s), I’m moderately safe as I have very good operational security skills. If you’re running Windows, it’s time for Windows 8, or if you don’t like Windows 8, Windows 7 with IE 10.
Recover – If you need to re-install, you had backups, right? Restore them. Get everything back the way you like it.
- Use the latest operating system. Windows XP has six months left on the clock. Upgrade to Windows 7 or 8. MacOS X 10.8 is a good upgrade if you’re still stuck on an older version. There is no reason not to upgrade. On Linux or your favorite alternative OS, there is zero reason not to use the latest LTS or latest released version. I make sure I live within my home directory, and have a list of packages I like to install on every new Linux install, so I’m productive in Linux about 20-30 minutes after installation.
- Patch all your systems with all of the latest patches. If you’re not good with this, enable automatic updates so it just happens for you automatically. You may need to reboot occasionally, so do so if your computer is asking you to do that. On Windows 8, it only takes 20 or so seconds. On MacOS X, it even remembers which apps and documents were open.
- Use a safer browser. Use IE 10. Use the latest Firefox. Use the latest Chrome. Don’t use older browsers or you will get owned.
- On a trusted device, preferably one that has been completely re-installed, it’s time to change ALL of your passwords as they are ALL compromised unless proven otherwise. I use a password manager. I like KeePass X, 1Password, and a few others. None of my accounts shares a password with any other account, and they’re all ridiculously strong.
- Protect your password manager. Make sure you have practiced backing up and restoring your password file. I’ve got it sprinkled around in a few trusted places so that I can recover my life if something bad was to happen to any single or even a few devices.
- Backups. I know, right? It’s always fun until all your data and life is gone. Backup, backup, backup! There are great tools out there – Time Capsule for Mac, Rebit for Windows, rsync for Unix types.
Learn and improve. It’s important to make sure that your Twitter feed remains your Twitter feed and in fact, all of your other accounts, too.
- Twitter has two factor authentication. Enable it and use it.
- Google has many forms of two factor authentication. Enable it and use it.
- Facebook has two factor authentication, login approvals. Enable it and use it.
- Apple has two factor authentication for iTunes / iCloud / iEtc. Enable it and use it.
- In fact, nearly everyone does, including your bank. Enable two factor authentication and use it.
I never use real data for questions and answers, such as my mother’s maiden name as that’s a public record, or my birth date, which like everyone else, I celebrate once per year and thus you could work it out if you met me even randomly at the right time of the year. These are shared knowledge questions, and thus an attacker can use that to bypass Twitter, Google’s and Facebook’s security settings. I either make it up or just insert a random value. For something low security like a newspaper login or similar, I don’t track these random values as I have my password manager to keep track of the actual password. For high value sites, I will record the random value to “What’s your favorite sports team”. It’s always fun reading out 25 characters of gibberish to a call centre in a developing country.
I might make a detailed assessment of the DM spam I’m getting, but honestly, it’s so amateur hour I can’t really be bothered. There is no “advanced” persistent threat here – these guys are really “why try harder?” when folks don’t undertake even the most basic of self protection.
Lastly – “don’t click shit“. If you don’t know the person or the URL seems hinky, don’t click it.
That goes double for infosec pros. You know better, or you will just after you click the link in Incognito / private mode. Instead, why not fire up that vulnerable but isolated XP throw away VM with a MITM proxy and do it properly if you really insist on getting pwned. If you don’t have time for that, don’t click shit.
This post is a last resort as I’ve had two comments rejected by the moderators at The Register, one of my favorite IT news websites.
Lewis Page is a regular contributor to the Register. For whatever reason, around 50% of his total output there is (willful mis-) reporting on various papers and research on climate science. Considering he (and for what it’s worth, myself) is not a climatologist, it’s very frustrating to see the “science” category tag on these articles. It wouldn’t be so bad if it was marked Opinion or Editorial, and that he wasn’t deliberately misrepresenting the observed facts, papers, research and scientists’ own words, but that he gives no truck at all to anything that doesn’t fit into his worldview.
Just to be utterly clear – among scientists who are trained in climatology, there is no doubt that we are in a rapidly changing world. Basically the question hasn’t been “if” there’s climate change for about 15-20 years, but “what does it mean to be on this planet in 10-20-50-100 years”. It’s up to us and the politicians to decide “what to do about it”. Even if climate change is not as bad as predicted (which actually, it’s worse than has been predicted), the actions we must take now are good for us and the planet:
- less air pollution == longer, heathier lives
- less water pollution == longer, healthier lives
- lower energy bills == more money for other things
- less wasteful consumption of a finite non-renewable resource == richer, more economically healthy future and longer production of things we can’t economically make without oil, like certain materials and medicines and so on
There is literally no downside to acting to curb emissions, but there’s a lot on the line if we don’t do something. Personally, I don’t think an ETS is the correct path as it’s a cheap way for the government to earn money and seen to be doing something – anything at all, but as it’s a derivative market, which has a colorful history of abuse (such as in Germany, where too many credits were issued undermining the market, and California, where traders essentially create artificial spikes in price to maximise profits and create artificial blackouts), but despite this, we must move on to the phase of our industrial planet.
I call on the Register to provide the scientific consensus view. Here’s my rejected comment in full.
It’s my long and fervent wish that the Register would stop publishing these opinion pieces, as I rather enjoy the “call a spade a f$&#ing spade” approach to almost all the other articles, reviews and IT news, which is rather let down by Mr Page’s long standing and regular missives on this topic.
In my opinion, these articles are not “science”, nor are they reasonable journalism, where the authors of the paper might be asked for a comment or an interview to get their side first hand. Mr Page can still have his opinion, but at least pay us the respect of writing about the researchers, paper or presentation in an unbiased way to allow us to compare Mr Page’s opinion with what they really wrote, demonstrated, observed or said.
At least pay us the respect of providing balanced coverage either by providing mainstream climate science coverage in the science category along with Mr Page’s opinion pieces and coverage, or by adding in right of reply, interviews and accurate coverage of what was actually written in the papers and research.
I’ve been mulling this one over for a while. And honestly, after a post to an internal global mail list at work putting forward my ideas, I’ve come to realise there are at least two camps in information security:
- Those who aim via various usual suspects to protect things
- Those who aim via various often controversial and novel means to protect people
Think about this for one second. If your compliance program is entirely around protecting critical data assets, you’re protecting things. If your infosec program is about reducing fraud, building resilience, or reducing harmful events, you’re protecting people, often from themselves.
I didn’t think my rather longish post, which brought together the ideas of the information swarm (it’s there, deal with it), information security asymmetry and pets/cattle (I rather like this one), would land with the heavy thud akin to 95 bullet points nailed to the church door.
So I started thinking – why do people still promulgate stupid policies that have no bearing on evidence? Why do people still believe that policies, standards, and spending squillions on edge and end point protection when it is trivial to break it?
Faith in our dads and grand dads that their received wisdom is appropriate for today’s conditions.
“Si Dieu n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer” Voltaire
(Often mis-translated as “if religion did not exist, it would be necessary to create it”, but close enough for my purposes)
I think we’re seeing the beginning of infosec religion, where it is not acceptable to speak up against unthinking enforcement of hand me down policies like 30 day password resets or absurd password complexity, where it is impossible to ask for reasonable alternatives when you attempt to rule out the imbecilic alternatives like basic authentication headers.
We cannot expect everyone using IT to do it right, or have high levels of operational security. Folks often have a quizzical laugh at my rather large random password collection and use of virtual machines to isolate Java and an icky SOE. But you know what? When Linked In got pwned, I had zero fears that my use of Linked In would compromise anything else. I had used a longish random password unique to Linked In. So I could take my time to reset that password, safe in the knowledge that even with the best GPU crackers in existence, the heat death of the universe would come before my password hash was cracked. Plenty of time. Fantastic … for me, and I finally get a pay off for being so paranoid.
But… I don’t check my main OS every day for malware I didn’t create. I don’t check the insides of my various devices for evil maid MITM or keyloggers. Let’s be honest – no one but the ultra paranoid do this, and they don’t get anything done. But infosec purists expect everyone to have a bleached white pristine machine to do things – or else the user is at fault for not maintaining their systems.
We have to stop protecting things and start protecting humans, by creating human friendly, resilient processes with appropriate checks and balances that do not break as soon as a key logger or network sniffer or more to the point, some skill is brought to bear. Security must be agreeable to humans, transparent (as in plain sight as well as easy to follow), equitable, and the user has to be in charge of their identity and linked personas, and ultimately their preferred level of privacy.
I am nailing my colors to the mast – we need to make information technology work for humans. It is our creature, to do with as we want. This human says “no“
A colleague of mine just received one of those awful marketing calls where the vendor rings *you* and demands your personal information “for privacy reasons” before continuing with the phone call.
As a consumer, you must hang up to avoid being scammed. End of story. No exceptions.
Even if the business has a relationship with the consumer, asking them to prove who they are is wildly inappropriate. Under no circumstances should a customer be required to provide personal information to an unknown caller. It must be the other way around – the firm must provide positive proof of who they are! And by calling the client, the firm already knows who the client is, so there’s no reason for the client to prove who they are.
As a business, you are directly hurting your bottom line and snatching defeat from the jaws of victory by asking your customers to prove their identity to you.
This is about the dumbest marketing mistake ever – many customers will automatically assume (correctly in my view) that the campaign is a scam, and repeatedly hang up, thus lowering goal completion rates and driving up the cost of sales. Thus this dumb move can cost a company millions in opportunity costs in the form of:
- wasted marketing (hundreds of dropped customer contacts for every “successful” completed sale),
- increase fraud to the consumer and ultimately the business when customers reject fraudulent transactions
- lose thousands if not hundreds of thousands of customers, and their ongoing and future revenue if they lose trust in the firm or by the firm’s lack of fraud prevention, cause them to suffer fraud by allowing scammers to easily harvest PII from the customer base and misuse it
Customers hate moving businesses once they have settled on a supplier of choice, but if you keep on hassling them the wrong way, they do up and leave.
So if any of you are in marketing or are facing pressure from the business to start your call script by asking for personally identifying information from your customers, you are training your customers to become victims of phishing attacks, which will cost you millions of dollars and many more lost customers than you’ll ever gain from doing the right thing.
It’s more than just time to change this very, very, very bad habit.
Everything now works.
The quick version is:
- Create a new Fedora 18 VM
- Do not use “Easy install”
- Disable 3D acceleration in the VM settings (Command-E) prior to starting the install, otherwise you get a spinning idle cursor and no action upon first boot
- Install as you see fit. I use a 64 bit F18, 4 GB of RAM (my Mac has 16 GB of RAM), 100 GB partition, and 4 virtual processors. YMMV. General rule of thumb is that 1 GB is plenty for a casual Gnome desktop, but if you’re using it for software development like me, then the more the better.
- Once installed, update all software using
sudo yum update
- and then reboot.
- This gets you to kernel 3.8.4-202.fc18.x86_64 at the time of writing. This is currently incompatible with VMware tools 9.2.2-893683, but there are known patches (see below) until a VMWare Tools update comes along.
- Let’s install the build tool chain needed to complete VMware Tool installation
sudo yum install patch kernel-devel kernel-headers gcc make
- Reboot just to make sure we’re all good
- Click “Install VMware Tools”
- Unzip the tar ball to ~/Downloads/vmware-tools-distrib/
- Visit this page http://erikbryantology.blogspot.com.au/2013/03/patching-vmware-tools-in-fedora-18.html
- Download the vmware9.k3.8rc4.patch and vmware9.compat_mm.patch patches, and if you feel like you’re not a patch wizard, the shell scripts that apply those patches, too.
- Follow the directions in the above page to patch the source to the VMCI and HGFS file system sharing modules
- Now build the patched VMware tools
- There should be no compilation ERRORS (there will be a couple of warnings, particularly for 64 bit architectures)
- Test drag and drop file sharing, cut n paste, screen resizing, shared folders, and printing to a MacOS X printer.
- If it’s all good, shutdown the VM
- Go to Settings for the VM (Command-E)
- In Display, re-enable 3D acceleration
- Start up the VM
At this point, you should have access to accelerated 3D within the VM and all VMWare Toolbox features.
Responsible disclosure is a double edged sword. The faustian bargain is I keep my mouth shut to give you time to fix the flaws, not ignore me. I would humbly suggest that it is very relevant to your interests when a top security researcher submits a business logic flaw to you that is trivially exploitable with just iTunes or a browser requiring no actual hacking skills.
If anyone knows anyone at Apple, please re-share or forward this post, and ask them to review my rather detailed description of my rather simple method of exploiting the Apple ID password reset system I submitted over six months ago with so far zero response beyond an automated reply. The report tracking number is #221529179 submitted August 12, 2012.
My issue should be fixed along with the other issues before they let password reset back online with my flaw intact.